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Indigenous people, campesinos, and workers, the three social sectors whose support was largely
responsible for Bolivian President Evo Morales' election, are now on the path of confrontation and,
at least for now, no longer feel that the president is their legitimate representative. As the head
of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), the party founded in the late 1990s, Morales was elected
president in 2005 (NotiSur, Jan. 6, 2006 ) with 54% of the votes. In December 2009, he was re-elected,
with the backing of 64% of society (NotiSur, Dec. 18, 2009). Polls taken in November 2010 indicated
that Morales still enjoyed extraordinary popular support.
Just three months later, however, in a mid-February public-opinion poll by the Catholic group Fides,
only 17.3% of respondents said they would vote for him again. At this time, the only president in
the history of the country to have freely traveled through the streets of all cities, spoken at open
meetings, and been taken for one of the people in soccer games, popular fiestas, or on public
transportation vehicles, can no longer appear in public without being heckled and hearing the worst
insults as he passes—"cabrón" (bastard), "traitor"—especially strong words that were always hurled
at the country's dictators or rightist leaders.
The abrupt political change in Bolivians began on Dec. 26, 2010, when the government issued a
decree eliminating some high subsidies on hydrocarbons, in place since the administration of
Gen. Hugo Banzer (1997-2001). Gasoline prices immediately jumped 82% and, with them, public-
transportation fares and basic-food prices.
Subsidy removal sets off protests
Although the measure was rescinded five days later, returning fuel prices to the previous level,
prices for essential goods have not dropped. Protests began in early January and continue in the
form of strikes, riots, looting, and even destroying and burning government buildings.
"What's new—and what really raises a question regarding the future—is that this time it's not the
right that's unhappy but rather Morales' very support bases," wrote Pablo Stefanoni, editor of the
Bolivian edition of . "It is the first popular uprising against a leftist government in the region and
shows Bolivia's difficulties in implementing a truly alternative development model as well as its
problems with fostering the desired 'industrial leap' that the Morales administration was betting on
for the country to move beyond an extractive economy."
The protests began in El Alto, a densely populated satellite city of the capital La Paz that is a
symbolic enclave for MAS and for Morales. In 2003, El Alto, at an altitude of 4,000 meters, was
the site of the first popular demonstrations that ended the neoliberal economic policies and the
government (NotiSur, Oct. 24, 2008) of former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003). It
has provided much of Morales' political and electoral power base.
From El Alto, thousands of demonstrators "descended" to La Paz to express their opposition in
front of the Casa de Gobierno. The marches spread to the rest of the country, especially to the most
LADB Article Id:  078163
ISSN:  1060-4189
©2011  The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved. Page 2 of 3
important bastions of the governing party's support: Chapare, the major coca-producing region
and cradle of Morales' union leadership; the indigenous altiplano, overwhelmingly Aymara—the
ethnic group Morales belongs to; and the campesino areas of the departments of Potosí (southeast),
Cochabamba (central), and Santa Cruz (eastern).
The first serious disturbances occurred in Llallagua, a town on the border with Chile and Argentina,
where miners and indigenous groups looted businesses and burned a police station. On Jan. 24, an
Erbol radio network reporter gave a dramatic account from there, saying that the mayor had asked
the government to send Army troops to quell the protest and that, in a real clash of poor against
poor, neighbors were arming to avoid more looting.
Union calls for huge wage increases
As the days passed, the break between Morales and his former followers deepened. "There is no
basic guide, the government has shown that it has no serious, long-term economic plan to ensure a
solution to the problems we are suffering. The government doesn't know how to stop the wave of
speculation and increased prices of essential products," said the powerful Confederación Obrera
Boliviana (COB), the workers central in which the miners exert a strong influence.
During the brief five days in which the decree that increased fuel prices was in effect, business
owners and merchants imposed unjustified and abusive increases of up to 100% for public
transportation, bread, sugar, dairy products, chicken, and beef. The COB is directing its criticism at
the government's lack of tools to force a reversal of the price hikes.
A study by the Catholic Fundación Jubileo, published by the Spanish news agency EFE, shows that,
in the poorest households, 60% of income goes to buy basic foodstuffs, and a report by the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), also quoted by EFE, says that 26% of the population suffers
from "extreme hunger."
The COB is demanding that the government pass a general wage increase and, although it failed to
achieve its goal, in recent weeks it called two general strikes. It asked Morales to personally sit down
and negotiate the minimum-wage increase, demanding it go from US$100 a month to US$1,100, an
elevenfold increase. "Get serious," replied Morales.
Taking advantage of popular discontent, business owners jumped into the fray, incorporating
their own demands. They summarized their demands with the term "legal security," which, in the
language of the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB), means eliminating
existing export quotas on certain products (limited to protect the domestic market), implementing a
policy to favor investment, and imposing a labor reform that will make contracts flexible and grant
tax breaks to businesses willing to create new jobs.
"Among other things, the idea is to offer greater certainty to those who come to do business in
Bolivia," said economist Gonzalo Chávez, closely linked to the private sector.
Given the potentially favorable situation for their interests, both the opposition leadership and the
Catholic Church—traditional allies—are remaining cautiously silent. Analysts say this provides
eloquent proof of the political right's lack of leaders and programs.
Government spokespersons point out that the decision to eliminate the fuel subsidy remains
legitimate. They add that the Bolivian people, who in the end pay for the subsidies, cannot afford
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to provide low-priced fuel to unscrupulous business people who do not look out for the public
good. And they note that domestic prices must be brought into line with international oil prices
because the low cost has given rise to a lucrative and persistent stream of contraband gasoline
into neighboring countries. In the weeks before the controversial decree was signed, government
officials offered these arguments but they were either unconvincing or did not know how to
communicate their message effectively to society.
Poor communication common in region
Various analysts agree that poor communication is a widespread problem among the governments
of the region. And, they give examples.
In March 2008, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner decided to increase export
taxes on soy. She did not explain that the money collected would be used to build schools, hospitals,
and roads. Thus, those affected were able to win public support presenting the measure as the first
phase in a wider confiscatory policy, when in reality it was a way to redistribute wealth in favor
of the neediest sectors of society. As a result, she lost support and the majority in both houses of
Congress in the 2009 legislative elections (NotiSur, April 11, 2008) and (July 10, 2009).
More recently, the Uruguayan government raised the possibility of transferring military personnel
to the security forces to stop a crime wave. It did not explain that they would cease being soldiers
when they joined the police and that the move would allow a reduction in the size of the Army. The
lack of accurate information allowed the large national and regional media outlets on the right to say
that President José Mujica had decided to send the military into the streets, a reality hated by South
Americans who in the last decades of the 20th century lived under bloody military dictatorships.
Today Mujica is paying the political price of a poorly communicated policy.
The painful Bolivian experience will be useful for other countries of the region, say various analysts
quoted by the media. Various Latin American governments will face complex situations in coming
years as they try to end subsidy policies, points out the Uruguayan weekly .
In times of social upheaval such as Bolivia experienced in the early 2000s, stability is won at
the price of increasing state spending through subsidies, food programs, and a wide array of
poverty-reduction policies. The great external demand for food and the cycle of rising commodity
prices allowed governments this increased spending. Now, however, more and more economists
believe that that cycle seems to be in decline and, sooner or later, because of a lack of resources,
governments will have to resort to eliminating subsidies.
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